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COMMENTS

UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ: REEVALUATING
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION

Throughout our nation's history, the Supreme Court has scrutinized
Congressional legislation to determine whether it passed constitutional
muster.' Many of the resulting interpretive controversies have involved

ISee, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (legislative finding that
judiciary has duty to determine what law is); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 (1938) (expressing need for judicial scrutiny). The judicial exercise of review is arguably a
power that runs against representative democracy theory, but has long been embedded in the
American form of government. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. In Marbury, the Court
established the concept of "judicial review" when it invalidated a portion of an act of Congress,
deeming it "repugnant" to the Constitution. See id. at 180. Interestingly, the Court had previously
upheldan act of Congress. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). Although seemingly anti-democratic, because the federal judiciary consists of a life-tenured minority, judicial
review and the judiciary itself were of major importance to the framers of the Constitution. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
No Legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this
would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do
The interpretation of the laws is the proper
not authorize, but what they forbid ....
and peculiar province of the courts.
Id.
Moreover, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court extended its power
of judicial review to include the review of state court interpretations of both the United States
Constitution and federal law, as well as state law in conflict with federal law. See Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (invalidating Virginia law which was in direct conflict with
Treaty of Paris (1783)); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that
Court may review state court decisions interpreting federal law).
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the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.'

Such controver-

sies have presented the Court with numerous opportunities to pronounce a
sound legal framework for determining the scope of Congress' commerce
power.3 Instead, over the years, the Court has established a myriad of
doctrines to determine whether a particular statute falls within the power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. 4 As a result of these

Although ensconced in the American political system, the Court's invalidation power has
been used sparingly; fewer than 100 acts of Congress have been invalidated. See WALTER F.
MURPHY & JAMES E. FLEMING, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 191 (1986).

In

fact, until the Civil War, only two Supreme Court decisions invalidated federal law. SeeMarbury,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (commonly known as
Dred Scott case).
2 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (holding valid federal law
prohibiting interstate transportation of lottery tickets) (commonly referred to as "The Lottery
Case"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 240 (1824) (finding states' licensing of
interstate travel unconstitutional because it interfered with commerce). The true starting point for
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the United States Constitution, which states that Congress has
the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
cl. 3. The derivation of the Commerce Clause provides significant insight into the Framers'
intentions in granting such power. The Madisonian view, developed at the time of drafting,
contended that the Articles of Confederation failed because of interstate trade wars. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-3 (1988). Thus, in order to create

a "more perfect union," interstate regulatory authority was shifted to Congress. Id. Under the
Madisonian view; Congress was to play a dormant role in interstate commerce since "Congress
would be expected to do very little in the field of commercial regulation, and the states would be
powerless to regulate interstate commerce even when Congress did nothing at all." Id. (citing
dictum in Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209).
3 On the other hand, it is submitted that the Court's introduction of numerous tests employed
to determine the extent of Congress' commerce power clouded its ability to discern a single
standard, rather than creating a sound doctrinal framework.
I The first Supreme Court case that squarely dealt with the Commerce Clause was Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. In Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall espoused a broad view
of the commerce power, holding Congressional authority over commerce valid and absolute
where such commerce "concerns more States than one." Id. at 194. Although a landmark case
outlining the powers of Congress, Gibbons did not sacrifice any powers reserved to the states.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend . . . commerce, which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State ....

[S]uch a power would be

inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary." Id. Given the historical context of the then-fledgling
nation, it is asserted that Gibbons stands as a symbolic example of Marshall's attempts to flex the
muscles of the young federal government, ensuring that rather than serving at the behest of the
states, it would work alongside them in the system of federal and state powers established by the
Constitution.
Not until after the Civil War, however, did the Court begin to establish the boundaries of
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. In The DanielBall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1870), the Court found that federal licensing of ships operating exclusively intrastate was
permissible if the ships held cargo destined for other states. Id. at 565. Several months earlier,
however, the Court invalidated for the first time a Congressional act as outside the scope of the
commerce power. See United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869). In DeWitt, the
Court stated that the Commerce Clause, while granting Congress the power to regulate commerce
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shifting standards, Commerce Clause jurisprudence enjoyed little rhyme or

reason and remained in a state of untidy confusion.

During much of the

between the States, also operated "as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal
trade and business of the separate States . . . ." Id. at 43-44.
The next historical period of Commerce Clause jurisprudence began with the passage of the
Interstate Commerce and Sherman Antitrust Acts. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-1301 (1963 & Supp. 1995);
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1995). These two Congressional acts signified the birth of the
federal regulatory state; no federal legislation had previously attempted to regulate entire sectors
of commercial business. Departing from the broad view set forth in Gibbons, the Court began
to limit the bounds of the Commerce Clause. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895). In E.C. Knight, the Court adopted the present definition of commerce by formally
separating commerce as distinct from manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. Id. at 16. The
Court held that the American Sugar Refining Company's objective was clearly private gain in the
manufacture of a commodity, and therefore was outside the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Id. at 17. Justice Fuller reasoned, "[tihat which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction
of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the
police power of the State." Id. at 12. The Court concluded, "[clommerce succeeds to
manufacture, and is not a part of it." Id.; see also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 60304 (1898) (holding that livestock exchange rules were local and thus outside Sherman Antitrust
Act); Barry Cushman, A Stream ofLegal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrinefrom
Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 109-10 (1992) (discussing dual federalism
and constraints it places upon commerce power): Donald H. Regan. The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986)
(discussing Dormant Commerce Clausejurisprudence as applied to movement-of-goods cases and
economic protectionism). The Court also checked Congressional authority under the Interstate
Commerce Act. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495. 548 (1935)
(distinguishing between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce by invalidating
regulations that related only indirectly to interstate commerce).
This period came to an abrupt conclusion during President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
when the Court decided the landmark case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel. 301 U.S. 1
(1937). Departing from the direct-indirect inquiry employed in Schechter, the Court held that
intrastate activities that had "a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce [such] that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions"
were within Congress' commerce power. Id. at 37. In effect, the Court returned to Marshall's
broad strokes in Gibbons.
The historical context of the Jones &Laughlin decision is notable. In response to the Court's
invalidation of some of his most important New Deal legislation, President Roosevelt devised the
ill-fated "Court-packing" scheme. The scheme proposed to add additional justices to the Court.
enabling Roosevelt to pack the high Court with justices of his favor. See Alpheus T. Mason,
HarlanFiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791, 796 (1952): Robert L. Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 677 (1946).
Thus, the Court was under strong political pressure at the time ofJones & Laughlin and appears
to have succumbed to that pressure. By ratifying the Congressional act, the Court discarded its
previous Commerce Clause doctrine. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 5-4.
1 A variety of differing theories and approaches developed from court decisions which
focused on the regulation of local activities related to interstate commerce, none of which were
formally renounced by later decisions. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942)
(establishing cumulative, additive effect principle which recognized that although acts of single
party had minimal effect on interstate commerce, same acts by multiple parties sufficiently
affected commerce and thus single party was subject to regulation), Jones & Laughlin. 301 U.S.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:579

twentieth century, the Court employed various tests to dismiss every
challenge to Congressional Commerce Clause legislation. 6 Recently,
however, in United States v. Lopez,7 the Supreme Court, for the first time
in sixty years, found a federal law violative of the Constitution on the
ground that it exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.8
In Lopez, the defendant, a 12th-grade student at a public high school
in San Antonio, Texas, brought a concealed handgun onto school grounds9
After school officials
in violation of both federal' ° and state laws."

at 37 (disagreeing with direct-indirect test and employing substantial relation to interstate
commerce test); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548 (expressing concern with ability to regulate where
link to interstate commerce is indirect); Houston, E.& W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States. 234
U.S. 342 (1914) (supporting practical economic standard): Swift & Co. v. United States. 196
U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (advocating "current of commerce" theory where local activities are subject
to regulation "in" interstate commerce); E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 1 (espousing logical nexus
standard between regulation and interstate commerce). The Court's Commerce Clause analyses
were most confusing prior to the decision in Jones & Laughlin. See Stuart Taylor Jr.. The Court
is Not a Right-Wing Nut. LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 1995, at 26 ("The Supreme Court's efforts to
delimit Congress' commerce power from the 1890's until 1937-the year of the Court's tactical
surrender to the New Deal-were replete with inconsistencies, arbitrary distinctions ...and
intellectually shabby opinions that ill-concealed justices' political biases. ....).
6 Following the New Deal and Jones & Laughlin, the Court repeatedly upheld Congress'
authority under the commerce power to regulate many different areas of the law. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding application of federal wageand-hour laws to state and local governments as employers), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (stating that intrastate loan sharking, primarily
controlled by organized crime, affected interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding that race discrimination by motel affected interstate
commerce): Katzenbach v. McClung. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that race discrimination by
small restaurant affects interstate commerce); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111 (1942) (holding that
completely intrastate activity under cumulative principle affected interstate commerce). See
generally Vicki C. Jackson, Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, LEGAL TIMES. July 31, 1995. at
S31 (presenting United States v. Lopez as shift away from string of decisions upholding federal
laws).
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Id. at 1630-31 (holding that act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms").
9 Id. at 1624, 1626: see Scott W. Wright, Ruling Casts Doubt on School Gun Ban; Appeals
Court Clouds Use of FederalLaw, Hous. CHRON.. Oct. 17, 1993. at 2 (noting that Lopez was
paid $40 for carrying gun and five bullets which were to be used by another student for -gang
war").
0o18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1988). Specifically, the statute provides: -It shall be unlawful
for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1988). It is
notable that Congress, in enacting the statute, did not provide any findings regarding a connection
to interstate commerce. In fact, Congress amended the statute in 1994 to include such findings:
(q)(1) The Congress finds and declares that (A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide
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discovered the firearm, the defendant was charged with violating Texas
law.' 2 The state law charges were dismissed, 3 however, when federal
agents charged the defendant with violating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act' 4 ("section 922(q)").' 5
The defendant contended that the statute exceeded Congress' power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause because the prohibited activity had no
connection to interstate commerce.' 6 The district court, on the basis of
prior Commerce Clause decisions, 7 disagreed and held both that section

problem:
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs,
guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been
found in increasing numbers in and around schools...
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in the
quality of education in our country(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate
commerce ... of the United States ....
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994).
Except for renumbering the statute to allow for the additions, there were no additional
changes. Apparently, Congress amended the statute in reaction to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Lopez. See United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting that amendment to Gun-Free School Zones Act was introduced into both houses of Congress subsequent to
Fifth Circuit's decision in Lopez). rev'd, 57 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court in
Lopez, however, was unimpressed by these late amendments. Moreover, the government did not
rely strictly upon the amendments during oral argument of the case. Lopez. 115 S.Ct. at 1631
n.4. In short, the amendments "made no difference to the Court ...[and] appears to have been
a futile effort to bring the statute within Congress' interstate commerce clause authority." Kim
Cauthorn, Supreme CourtInterpretsScope of CongressionalAuthorihyUnderInterstateCommerce
Clause, 33 Hous. LAW. 15, 15-16 (1995).
" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03 (vest 1994) (originally enacted as § 46.04 and amended
in 1991). The relevant portion of this statute reads:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a firearm ... he intentionally, knowingly.
or recklessly goes:
(1) on the physical premises of a school ... whether the school or educational
institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written
authorization of the institution ....
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West 1994).
1 United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
13

Id.

14Id.

18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994); Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702(a), 104 Stat. 4844 ("This section
may be cited as the 'Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.'").
16 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. Lopez claimed Congress could not "legislate control over...
public schools." Id. Additionally, Lopez asserted § 922(q) was not -enacted in furtherance of any
of [Congress'] enumerated powers." United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
aff'd. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
"IId. at 1360-68. See generally supra notes 1, 2,4, 5 (summarizing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
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922(q) was constitutional18 and that the defendant had violated the
statute. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, finding that section 922(q) had only a tenuous connection to
interstate commerce,2' and, therefore, failed to meet the substantial
connection test required of Commerce Clause legislation.2 ' In an opinion
resembling that of the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion,
affirmed. 2

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that enactment
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond Congress' Commerce

Clause powers since it neither regulated commercial activity'

nor

S Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Specifically, the district court found that Congress had a "'welldefined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary,
middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce.'" Id. (quoting district court opinion).
It is unclear whether the district court's view was pervasive since Lopez seems to have been the
first individual to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(q). Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.

,9Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.

oLopez, 2 F.3d at 1367. Although this view was followed by several other circuits, universal
acceptance was hardly achieved. See United States v. Trigg. 842 F. Supp. 450. 453 (D. Kan.
1994) (finding that guns near schools did not affect interstate commerce); United States v.
Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (finding § 922(q) unrelated to interstate
commerce). But see United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on
United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991)) (finding that Congress could have rational
basis for regulating possession of guns). cert. grantedandjudgment vacated by. 115 S. Ct. 1819
(1995); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327. 1336-37 (D. Kan. 1994) (upholding validity
of Gun-Free School Zones Act), rev'd, 57 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1995). Interestingly, in Edwards,
the government could have convicted the defendant solely under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for the
unauthorized possession of a sawed-off shotgun. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292. Additionally, in
Glover, the court not only concluded that the act was valid, but believed measures should be
taken to eliminate possessions of guns. Glover, 842 F. Supp. at 1337.
Specifically, the Lopez court noted that under § 922(q). the government was not required
to show that plaintiff's act had any logical connection to interstate commerce. Lopez. 2 F.3d at
1348.
"1Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362. Specifically, the court noted:
[i]f the reach of the commerce power to local activity that merely affects interstate
commerce or its regulation is not understood as being limited by some concept such
as "substantially" affects, then, contrary to Gibbons v. Ogden, the scope of the
Commerce Clause would be unlimited, it would extend "to every description- of
commerce and there would be no "exclusively internal commerce of a state" the
existence of which the Commerce Clause itself "presupposes" and the regulation of
which it "reserved for the state itself."
Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.
3 (granting to Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"): U.S. CONST. amend.
X (reserving to States all powers not delegated to Congress by Constitution).
22Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1634.
2 Id. at 1630-31 (recognizing that § 922(q) was solely criminal statute and had no connection
to economic activity which could affect interstate commerce).
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required that gun possession be linked to interstate commerce.2 4 In
tracing the development of Congress' Commerce Clause power,' Justice
Rehnquist noted three categories which would permit regulation,26 but
determined that only the third was relevant to test the validity of section

922(q) 27-namely, the activity must have "a substantial relation to interstate
commerce."'

Justice Rehnquist then set forth the definitive standard for

adjudicating claims on this level: the activity must "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. 29 Applying this test to section 922(q), the majority
noted that Congress had no findings on which to base a connection between

24 Id. at 1631 (noting that there was no express requirement that gun possession be linked to

interstate commerce).
I See id. at 1627-30. The majority pointed to an extensive body of case law which once
focused on direct versus indirect effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 1627-28 (citing A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), the Court rejected this test and instead focused on whether
the activity had "a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce." Lopez. 115 S. Ct. at
1628 (citingJones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37). While this test remained valid until Lopez. it was
significantly diminished by less stringent standards. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (employing test that simply questioned whether
activity regulated "affects interstate commerce"). The diminished test is likely to have resulted
from an additional inquiry which asked whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding
whether the activity had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1629: Katzenbach v. McClung. 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[Wlhere we find that the
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an
end."); see also supra notes 1, 2, 4. 5 (summarizing Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
I Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. The Court established the three categories in Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). The first area permitted Congress to regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. Under the second. "Congress [was]
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce." Id. Under the third, Congress was empowered to regulate "those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 1629-30.
Id. at 1630 (stating that § 922(q) does not fit into first two categories and therefore must
fit into third to be valid).
2 Id. at 1629-30.
29Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630; see also Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363. Although this test was not new,
see, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, over the years it had been diminished by the rational
basis standard for judging a substantial effect. See, e.g., McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04 (stressing
important need for rational basis while only briefly mentioning "substantial affect" requirement);
see infra Part II.B. and accompanying notes (describing judicial history of erosion of rational
basis standard). The Fifth Circuit noted that "[w]here Congress has made findings, formal or
informal, that regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer
'if there is any rational basis for' the finding. Practically speaking, such findings almost always
end the matter." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted). The court also noted that "[w]e know
of no Supreme Court decision in the last half century that has set aside such a finding as without
a rational basis." Id. at 1363 n.43.
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the activity regulated by the statute and interstate commerce.30 Moreover,

the absence of Congressional findings, while not dispositive, 3" factored
into the majority's inability to find a "rational basis" for the statute's

enactment. 32 This was significant since the "rational basis" test had
previously been the standard of review. 33 Most importantly, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that permitting such legislation would give Congress
unlimited regulatory power since every activity, in some manner, can be
traced to interstate commerce.34
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy also traced the history of
Commerce Clause decisions 35 and questioned whether the Court's opinion
might upset established precedents.36 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy
determined that section 922(q) must be deemed unconstitutional due to its
harmful effect on the balance of federal and state relations. 37 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy agreed that section 922(q) had no "evident commercial

I

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (noting that there were no express findings in either legislative
history or congressional hearings); see supra note 10 (discussing that carrying of gun had no
discernible ties to interstate commerce).
-1 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (noting that Congress is not required to make formal findings).
32 Id. at 1632.
11Prior to Lopez, the "rational basis" test was the standard for judicial review of Commerce
Clause challenges. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04: see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264. 276 (1980): Perez v. United States. 402 U.S. 146. 155-57
(1971).
1 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (stating that Congress would be allowed to regulate family
law "including marriage, divorce, and child custody" if it could be linked to economic productivity); see also Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366 (noting that Gun-Free School Zones Act could be extended
to "criminalize any person's carrying of any unloaded shotgun, in an unlocked pick-up truck gun
rack, while driving on a county road that . . . happens to come within 950 feet of. . .a oneroom church kindergarten located on the other side of a river, even during the summer when [it
was] not in session"): United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (-The
air in the soccer ball used on the school playground. or a molecule or two of milk dispensed in
the school cafeteria . . . undoubtedly crossed some state line before arriving at the school.-).
Moreover, neither the government nor Justice Breyer in his dissent could identify an activity
which Congress could not regulate under their arguments. Lopez. 115 S. Ct. at 1632. 1658: see
William Banks, At the Hatlfvay Point. 81 A.B.A. J.50 (Apr. 1995).
35Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J.. concurring).
36 See id. at 1634 (Kennedy. J.,concurring).
3 See id. at 1640-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In reaching this conclusion. Justice Kennedy
considered the judiciary's role in determining -what the law is." Id. at 1639-40 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (referring to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). While questioning
how the majority's opinion might affect prior Commerce Clause decisions, Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that, despite the great deference given to Congress in this area, the Court still has
a role "in determining the meaning of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring).
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nexus"38 and thus regulated an area traditionally reserved to the states.39
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the result, but

urged a more thorough review of Congressional Commerce Clause
powers.' ° Justice Thomas felt that the "substantially affects" test departed

from the original intent of the Constitution. 4'

He contended that the

Court's prior decisions gave Congress excessively broad authority, which

permitted it to regulate matters having only a remote connection to
interstate commerce.42

Thus, the case law provided Congress with

inordinate "police powers" in contravention to the Constitution.43
38Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). To Justice Kennedy, the world we
live in today makes all activities interdependent to some extent with commerce. Id. (Kennedy.
J.. concurring). Nonetheless, this incidental connection is not strong enough to support the
conclusion that Congress has the authority to regulate all activities through the commerce power.
See id. (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
31 Id. at 1640-41 (Kennedy, J.,concurring) ("[E]ducation is a traditional concern of the
States."). Even if one were to admit that the regulation of guns had nothing to do with the
regulation of education, see, e.g., Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (stating that regulation of drugs on
school property was within province of federal regulation. not element of education falling within
province of states), Justice Kennedy properly tied the connection to a state's ability to best devise
the means for controlling a local problem. See Lopez. 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J..
concurring) (noting that states are laboratories for test solutions best suited to local problems).
To this end, Justice Kennedy noted that over 40 states had legislation banning the possession of
guns in or near schools. Id. (Kennedy. J.. concurring); see infra notes 99, 104. 105 (discussing
conflict of federal regulation impinging upon areas traditionally regulated by states). Today,
almost every state has enacted some type of gun-free school zone legislation. Maria Newman,
Some ProgressIs Seen on FederalInitiativefor Gun Free Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1995.
at A27.
I Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J.. concurring). Specifically. Justice Thomas urged
the Court to "temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of
our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring). This belief was apparently based upon Justice Thomas' strong view that
commerce did not include manufacturing or agriculture, but instead involved only exchange,
trade, or traffic. See id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring) (looking to definition of commerce as
intended by Founding Fathers); S. Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th
ed. 1773) (defining commerce as "exchange of one thing for another: interchange of any one
thing; trade, traffic").
4, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that appending phrase
"substantially affects" to Commerce Clause makes other enumerated powers superfluous since
they could naturally be linked to expanded notion of Commerce Clause); see also id. at 1650
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that Court's continued use of "substantially affects" test is no
longer "radical," but is still far removed from Constitution).
42Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "aggregation principle" focuses not on
how particular individual activity affects commerce, but upon all activity as a whole). Justice
Thomas correctly points out that "one always can draw [a] circle broadly enough to cover an
activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
13 See id. at 1649; Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787,
1816 (1994) (recognizing that Court's prior decisions created risk of "a general federal police
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Three separate dissenting opinions clearly revealed the fragmented 5-4
split of the Court." Justice Stevens' dissent urged that guns are inherently "articles of commerce"'45 and are therefore necessarily subject to
regulation. 6 He argued that, because firearms possess a great potential
for harm, Congress' regulatory power includes the power to prohibit their
possession at any location, including schools. 47
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter argued that the majority took a
step backward in its holding.'
Justice Souter firmly believed in the
rational basis test and argued that such a standard was the proper judicial
inquiry.49 He reasoned that, since the Court had to conduct an independent review of the challenged legislation, no conclusion could be drawn
from the fact that Congress did not provide specific findings regarding an
interstate commerce connection.50 Therefore, based upon Justice Breyer's

power").
' Lopez generated six different opinions including the Court's opinion, concurring opinions
by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens, Souter. and
Breyer. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1624.
" Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "possession is the
consequence, either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity." Id. (Stevens. J., dissenting).
Apparently then, Justice Stevens would fit § 922(q) into the second category of possible
Commerce Clause regulation articulated by Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 1629 (Stevens, J..
dissenting).
I Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, because of harmful nature, Congress can
determine where possession of guns is not allowed).
I' See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens implied that guns
are particularly harmful to children because gun manufacturers specifically target them as a
market. See id. (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
" Id. at 1651, 1654 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice Souter traced the development of
Congress' Commerce Clause powers and was convinced that the Court was dangerously
approaching the failed dichotomy of direct and indirect effects upon commerce. See id. at 165254 (Souter. J., dissenting).
41See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter indicated that the
rational basis requirement is the threshold determination in Commerce Clause analysis. See id.
(Souter, J.,dissenting). The Court's role, according to Justice Souter. is simply to determine
whether Congress could rationally have found a substantial effect on interstate commerce since
the mere fact that Congress enacted the legislation is proof that they did find such an impact. Id.
(Souter, J.,dissenting).
I Lopez. 115 S.Ct. at 1656 (Souter. J., dissenting). Even when Congress provided factual
findings, Justice Souter argued that judicial review was necessary. Id. (Souter. J.. dissenting).
A review of the Court's history, however, shows that this is not the case. Specifically, under the
rational basis test previously applied by the Court, Congressional statements were given great
deference and the level of review simply amounted to determining whether the statements were
rational. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("[W]here we find that
the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."). Such a reality is clearly evident in
Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez, in which Justice Souter joined. See Lopez. 115 S.Ct. at 1658
(Breyer, J.. dissenting) (stating that question before Court is not whether activity affected
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dissent, Justice Souter had no difficulty concluding that section 922(q) was
constitutional, since Congress could rationally have found that guns have

a significant effect upon interstate commerce.'
Justice Breyer authored the final and most notable dissent. 52 He gave
little consideration to terms such as "substantial" or "significant. " '

Instead, Justice Breyer contended that the rational basis test alone was to
be employed in determining the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
powers.M Justice Breyer conducted an independent review of the problems
associated with guns on or near school grounds, applied the rational basis
test, and concluded that there was clearly a problem which ultimately
affected interstate commerce.55 As a result, Justice Breyer found that
"Congress could rationally have concluded that the links [were] 'substantial."'56 Justice Breyer also argued that such a finding comported with
previous Court decisions, while the majority opinion upset "well settled"

case lawi 7
This Comment examines the Lopez decision and suggests that it is an

appropriate step in establishing a firm framework for marking the bounds
commerce, but whether Congress could conclude it did). Nothwithstanding this view, it is
submitted that such review amounts to nothing more than rubber-stamping the legislation. See,
e.g.. Rebecca Frank Dallet, Foucha v. Louisiana: The Danger of Connitment Based in
Dangerousness, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157, 191 (1993) (-A rational basis test is merely a
rubber stamp of constitutionality."): George C. Hlavac, Interpretationof the Equal Protection
Clause: A ConstitutionalShell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1377 (1993) (i[Many
commentators consider the rational-basis test to be a rubber stamp of constitutionality . . . ").
-, See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J.. dissenting) (noting that Justice Breyer conducted
extensive research into problem Congress addressed and provided his findings in his dissent), see
also infra note 55 and accompanying text (using Breyer's findings to support conclusion that
substantial links to commerce could be shown).
52 Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (all other dissenting justices joined in this dissent).
53Id. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyeropined that the rational basis test was
the Court's only concern since Congress is assumed to have found a sufficient connection between
interstate commerce and the activity in issue. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Like Justice Souter. he
noted that Congress' express statements regarding the existence of a connection were not
conclusive since the Court must still engage in verifying the rationality of this determination. Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course. the applicable degree of scrutiny is the subject of considerable
debate. See supra note 49.
"ILopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5' Id. at 1659-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that presence of guns affected learning,
affecting job skills and making United States weaker, which in turn affected both national and
international commerce).
" Id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
. Id. at 1662-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer made a compelling comparison of
the facts at issue in Lopez with the civil rights case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964). which found that racial discrimination at a local restaurant had an effect on interstate
commerce. Id. at 1662-63 (stating that violence inhibits families and businesses from moving into
neighborhoods).
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of Congressional authority. It is submitted that the Court must intervene
when Congress promulgates laws which bear no real relationship to
"interstate commerce" in its true sense: the transportation of goods, people,
and services over state lines. The mere fact that Congress can point to
connections to interstate commerce that may appear rational should not
immunize legislation from judicial scrutiny. Instead, the Court must
ascertain whether the act does indeed fall within Congress' power.
It is further suggested that the Court's reluctance to interfere with
Congressional efforts to regulate those affairs traditionally reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment (whether in the areas of crime,
education, manufacture, agriculture, or civil rights) jeopardizes the system
of federalism upon which the nation was founded. Furthermore, such
reluctance will permit resources to be wasted by laying duplicative federal
layers of bureaucracy over established state functions. Finally, this
Comment concludes that Lopez sets the proper standard for judging the
limits of Congress' commerce powers and sets forth a standard that should
be maintained if we are to respect the integrity of the Constitution.
Part One of this Comment discusses the development of the "substantially affects" test used in Lopez. Part Two examines the effect of the
Lopez decision on Commerce Clause jurisprudence, federalism principles,
and the role of the Court in judicial review. Finally, this Comment
discusses the future of federal legislation under the Lopez decision.
I.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS" TEST

The New Deal Era

During the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the
Supreme Court invalidated a number of federal programs on the ground
that they exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power.5" These decisions

' See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 violated Commerce Clause): United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1(1936)
(stating that Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was invalid under taxing clause): A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National Industrial
Recovery Act ("NIRA-) of 1933): Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co.. 295 U.S. 330
(1935) (striking down Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as unconstitutional and remote from any
regulation of commerce). In holding that the NIRA was outside the scope of the Commerce
Clause, the Schechter Court reasoned:
It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution
does not provide for it. Our growth and development have called for wide use of the
commerce power of the federal government in its control over the expanded activities
of interstate commerce, and in protecting that commerce from burdens, interferences.
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were met with much criticism from "New Dealers."

The tenor of such

criticism was perhaps best exemplified by President Roosevelt's famous
remark, "[w]e have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of

interstate commerce." 5 9 President Roosevelt criticized the "Nine Old
Men"' on the Court whose decisions stymied his New Deal programs.
As a result of the Court's refusal to implement New Deal programs,
Roosevelt devised his infamous Court-packing scheme to alter the

composition of the Court.6'

During the Court-packing controversy, the

and conspiracies to restrain and monopolize it. But the authority of the federal
government may not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which
the commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce "among the several States"
and the internal concerns of a State.
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 549-50. Even during this period, by upholding federal legislation
regulating local activity when the Tenth Amendment was not in issue, the Court declined to limit
federal power. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND

PROCEDURE § 4.7, at 392-93 (2d ed. 1992), see also United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100. 12324 (1940) (stating that Tenth Amendment is not obstacle to federal power): Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (upholding establishment of federally
controlled dam and hydroelectric power plant): Sonzinsky v. United States. 300 U.S. 506 (1937)
(upholding tax on firearms that was clearly designed to regulate firearms): Norman v. Baltimore
& O.R. Co.. 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding federal legislation abrogating contract clauses for
payment in gold in order to regulate national currency).
-931 May 1935 4 THE PUB. PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 200, 221

(Samuel I. Rosenman ed.. 1938).
1 Six of the nine Supreme Court justices in 1937 were over 70 years old. Justices Hughes.
Sutherland. and McReynolds were 75. Justice Van Devanter was 78, and Justice Brandeis was
81.
61See David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court Has Yet to
Reveal the True Significance of Lopez, 81 A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (July 1995). The "court packing
plan" began in February of 1937 after President Roosevelt won a landslide victory in the 1936
presidential elections. "The President asked for legislative authority to appoint an additional
federal judge for each judge who was 70 years of age" which would create a total of 15 members
on the Supreme Court since six of the nine justices were over the age of 70. ROTUNDA &
NOVAK. supra note 58, § 4.7, at 393 (discussing ages of Court justices); see also supra note 63
and accompanying text. The proposal was met with great controversy and disapproval even from
Roosevelt's own party. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 58, § 2.7, at 108. After heated debate
and extensive hearings conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the plan was flatly rejected
"as a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle." S. REP.
No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 23 (1937). Although the plan was ultimately defeated, the
Court began to uphold several substantial New Deal measures. See, e.g.. NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1. (1937) (upholding NLRB's authority under the Commerce
Clause to enforce fair labor practices); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding oldage benefit through social security tax); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
(upholding provisions of federal unemployment insurance benefits). Whether the Court's aboutface resulted from the "Court-packing plan" or other reasons is debatable: nevertheless, the
dissent apparent in the pre-1937 cases became the majority thereafter. See generally LEONARD
BAKER,

BACK TO BACK-THE DUEL BETWEEN

FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967)

(discussing introduction of Court-packing and ultimate victory of President Roosevelt):
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Court announced a surprising decision in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,62 which upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 on
the ground that the act had "a close and substantial relation to interstate

commerce .

.63
".. This decision marked a major expansion of Congres-

sional authority under the Commerce Clause.'
Soon after Jones &
Laughlin, the Court decided United States v. Darby,65 which ratified the
new "substantially affects" test. 66
The Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn67 opened the
floodgates of Congressional authority. 68 The Wickard Court, while

Cox. THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-73 (1987) (explaining expansion of
federal power): GERALD GUNTHER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122-24 (12th ed. 1991) (describing
defeat of and opposition to court-packing plan and Roosevelt's attempts to implement it);
ARCHIBALD

WALLACE MENDELSON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 107-27

(1980) (enumerating post-New Deal cases that deemed Court reorganization plan unnecessary);
JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN POLITICS 382-83 (1984) (noting
New Deal's acceptance in 1936 as defeating underlying reason for Court-packing plan).
6-,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
63Id. at 37 ("Although activities may be intrastate .. . if they have such a close and
substantialrelation to interstatecommerce ...Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
that control.") (emphasis added).
64 See Cox, supra note 61, at 156; ROTUNDA & NOWAK. supra note 58. § 4.9. With the
decision handed down by the Court in Jones & Laughlin, the Court's change in philosophy
created a "revolutionary turning point toward modern interpretation of the scope of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce." Cox. supra note 61, at 156: see also ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 58, § 4.9 (noting that approach in Jones & Laughlin was "quite different"
from previous cases). Professor Barry Cushman commented that "[miore than a generation of
constitutional historians have viewed the events of 1937 as a political drama in which a recalcitrant judiciary reluctantly knuckled under to the political muscle of Franklin Roosevelt."
Cushman, supra note 4. at 105. The Jones & Laughlin decision returned to Justice Marshall's
definition of Congress' "plenary powers." discarding the "current of commerce" theory as an
inappropriate judicial restriction on the commerce power. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
58, § 4.8; Jones & Laughlin. 301 U.S. at 36 ("The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to
be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate . . . commerce.").
6 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
66Id. at 119-20 (stating that Congress can regulate activity which has -substantial effect" on
interstate commerce). The Darby Court also broke new ground by finding that the Commerce
Clause "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . to make
regulation of them [an] appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end .
. Id. at 118.
67 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
s See Lopez. 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (stating that Wickard "is perhaps the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity"): Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co..
491 U.S. 1,20 (1989) ("It would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the commerce
power."): SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 61, at 397 ("The Filburn case demonstrated the extent to
which the broad construction of the commerce clause could be carried.. . ."); Bruce Ackerman
& David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857 n.255 (1995) (Wickard
"construed Congress's commerce powers as virtually unlimited"): John A. Leman, Comment,
The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and the Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C.
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employing the "substantially affects" test,69 found that Congress could

regulate local activity which, standing alone, may be trivial but, if "taken70
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
After Wickard, the conventional wisdom was that "the [C]ommerce
[C]lause was infinitely elastic,"7 and that challenges to federal statutes on
had exceeded its commerce power were
the grounds that Congress
72
"invariably doomed."
B. Erosion of the "SubstantiallyAffects" Test
In the Court's struggle to define Congress' Commerce Clause power,
the "substantially affects" test was quickly eroded. Wickard had empowered Congress with considerable authority to enact seemingly unlimited
legislation under the Commerce Clause.73 Moreover, the Court expanded

DAVIS L. REV. 1237, 1247 n.48 (1995) ("Perhaps the single greatest expansion of the commerce
power came in the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn. .. . "): James Podgers. The
Longest Victory, 81 A.B.A. J. 58. 64 (May 1995) (stating that Wickard "marked a high point in
the Court's deference to federal regulation ... under the commerce clause" and that -there was
virtually no area of the economy that the commerce clause couldn't touch").
69 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (finding that Congress may reach activity "if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce-).
11Id. at 127-28. Wickard involved a farmer who grew his own wheat, some for his own
consumption. Id. at 114. In violation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. he grew more
than his quota. Id. This violation resulted in a federally-imposed fine, measured by the excess
wheat. Id.
11Paul D. Kamenar, United States v. Lopez: The Feds Lose a Piece of Their Rock, LEGAL
TIMES, May 8, 1995, at 25.
_Id. Constitutional law scholar Ronald Rotunda commented that since Jones & Laughlin,
"a typical question mooted in constitutional law classes was whether there were any limits to the
federal commerce power." Ronald D. Rotunda, Cases Refine Definition of Federal Powers.
NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995. at C9. The power of the federal government has widened via

increasingly liberal interpretations of the constitutional power granted under the Commerce
Clause. Carter H. Strickland, Jr., The Scope of Authori. of Natural Resource Trustees, 20
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 319 n.106 (1995). Further, Professor Archibald Cox has noted:
[Tihe possession of congressional power should not be confused with its exercise.
Logically, Congress can regulate every detail of almost every commercial transaction,
....
It has not exercised its full power, at least partly because of concern for the
balance of the federal system .... The principal issue becomes, how widely should
Congress choose to extend federal regulation. Political opinions upon the wisdom of
that transfer of responsibility differ widely ....
Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court,1965 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudicationand the
Promotionof Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 118-19 (1966).
7- See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. By holding that Congress' commerce powers "extend to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce," id. (quoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)), the Wickard Court "completed the move to
recognizing a plenary commerce power based on economic theory." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 58, § 4.9; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 196 (1824) ("This power [of
Congress over interstate commerce] is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
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this authority when it departed from the "substantially affects" test in
Katzenbach v. McClung,74 and instead applied the "rational basis" test to
evaluate Commerce Clause legislation. 75 Relying primarily on legislative
history,76 the Court had only to determine whether Congress had a rational
basis to support a connection between the legislation and interstate
commerce. 7 While the test was intended merely to define the standard of

and acknowledges no limitations, other than as prescribed in the constitution.-). The articulation
of the rational basis test established this deference toward the legislature. See infra notes 76-83
and accompanying text (explaining rational basis test): see also United States v. Lopez. 115 S.
Ct. 1624, 1653 (1995) (Souter, J.. dissenting) ("[Deference became articulate in the standard of
rationality review."), United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir.) (-We therefore must
give substantial deference to a [c]ongressional determination .

. .

. ") (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct.

at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 750 (1995): Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A court's review of congressional
enactments under the Commerce Clause should be highly deferential.") (citing United States v.
Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Edwards. 13 F.3d 291. 293 (9th
Cir. 1993) (stating that Commerce Clause review is highly deferential), cert. grantedandjudg.
vacated by, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995).
74 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
71 Id. at 303-04 ("[W]here we find that the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding
a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an
end.").
76 See id. at 299-300. McClung applied the rational basis test to a regulation which did not
include an express statement drawing a connection to commerce. Its legislative history. however.
expressed such a connection. Id. at 300 (finding ample evidence that racial discrimination affected
interstate travel and interstate commerce). McClung followed the companion civil rights case.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). in which the Court relied
on legislative history in the absence of formal congressional findings. The Court did not require
formal findings, stating that "this is a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not
with the courts. . . . The Constitution requires no more." Id. at 261-62; see also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) ("We do so not to infer that Congress need make particularized
findings in order to legislate."), United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336. 347 (1971) (finding
ambiguous congressional purpose in Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968);
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441.450-51 (1953) (relying on Congressional
findings of connection between gambling and commerce).
The test's application was not limited to instances where there were no formal findings by
Congress. The test was first applied to legislation in which Congress expressly included findings
drawing a connection to commerce. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (stating that Congress included findings of harmful effects of
surface coal mining in act); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563. 571 (1977) (noting that
Congress provided express link of firearm possession to commerce): Perez. 402 U.S. at 156
(relying upon formalized findings of Congress pertaining to effect of loan sharking on commerce).
Secondly, the test applied to legislation that revealed no Congressional link to commerce,
either in the legislative history or in the statute itself. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342. 136768 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that there were "insufficient" legislative findings and history). aff'd,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Lopez was the first case to reach the Court without such findings.
illustrating the ease with which Congress could enact legislation.
11See, e.g.. Virginia Surface, 452 U.S. at 277-78 ("[The courts need inquire only whether
the finding is rational .

. .

. The legislative record provides ample support for these statutory

1995]

COMMERCE CLAUSE

judicial review, it, in effect, stripped the "substantially affects" test of

considerable "bite."7"

Rather than focusing on Congress' commerce

powers, the rational basis test examined (in a rather cursory manner) the
problem which Congress sought to remedy through the legislation.79
A fundamental criticism of the rational basis test is that it enabled
Congress to enact virtually any type of legislation, asserting the Commerce
Clause as its source of authority.' As Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez
findings."); McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04 ("[W]e must conclude that [Congress] had a rational
basis for finding that racial discrimination .. . had a direct

.. . effect on . . . interstate

commerce."); Heart ofAtlanta, 379 U.S. at 261 (concluding that racial discrimination rationally
had effect on commerce). The test, however, resulted in the presumption that Congress had found
a sufficient nexus, and the Court merely had to determine whether this conclusion was reasonable.
"A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that
there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and
the asserted ends." Hodel v. Indiana. 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). Scarborough. 431 U.S. at
567-68 (showing that movement of firearms through interstate commerce created sufficient
minimal nexus). Thus, the test seems completely to ignore the issue of whether there is in fact
a substantial effect and instead focuses on the ends which the legislation seeks to achieve. In view
of the deference given to Congress, it is easy to see how the Supreme Court, or any lower federal
court, could conclude there is a rational basis upon the most minimal Congressional findings. See
also Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (requiring nexus with interstate commerce); Scarborough.431 U.S.
at 568 (finding that single movement through interstate commerce satisfied nexus requirement).
71Itis very easy to make a compelling argument that something is rational. -Benjamin
Franklin said, it is wonderful to be a rational animal, that there is a reason for everything that
one does." Joseph Calve, Anatomy of a Landmark, RECORDER. Aug. 3. 1995. at 1 (quoting
Justice Scalia from oral argument in Lopez).
" See Virginia Surface, 452 U.S. at 326. The Court stated:
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or
unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power
of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarilyfor Congress to consider
and decide the fact of danger and meet it. This Court will certainly not substitute its
judgmentfor that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce
and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.
Id. (citing Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922) (emphasis added)).
In most instances, it is difficult to challenge the end Congress has sought to achieve. See
Lopez. 115 S.Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that few "would argue that it is wise
policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises"). However, to be accepted, such
legislation must be within Congress' actual power to enact. See United States v. Trigg. 842 F.
Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994) ("There is no place for weapons- particularly firearms-in and
around schools. Nevertheless, Congress must legislate in the area of firearms within the
constraints imposed by the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364,
366 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("A generalized salutary purpose is simply not enough to justify the
creation of a new federal crime.").
80Since its inception, Congress has used the test as its primary means for legislating in the
criminal arena. See United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)
("Congress has had a recent penchant for passing a federal criminal statute on any well-publicized
criminal activity. The courts, in . . .deference to the legislative branch. .
Commerce Clause . . .beyond the wildest imagination of the Framers . .

.

. have stretched the
rev'd. 30 F.3d

. .").
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illustrates, it is quite easy to rationalize how particular legislation may
affect interstate commerce.8" Congress' exercise of such enormous power
clearly does harm to the independence and sovereignty of the states.
Further, the application of the rational basis test also has led Congress to
include express findings in its legislative enactments.
Such findings

virtually ensure that the legislation will survive limited judicial scrutiny.
Thus, for decades, Congress grew accustomed to legislating in practically
any area it wished, provided the legislation was accompanied by a general
statement alleging that the activity affected interstate commerce. The Lopez
decision ensures that Congress may no longer employ such verbal niceties
in order to pass constitutional muster.8"
The Court further diminished the "substantially affects" test by
lowering the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. For example, rather
than requiring a substantial effect, some courts merely required any effect

135 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995): see also Joseph Calve. What Does
Lopez Mean?, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 1. ("[The] Supreme Court may have been
sending a political message ... about the over-federalization of street crime."). In fact, the states
have not challenged a good portion of such legislation since its effect is to take away from the
states the blame for problems in the system or its implementation. See, e.g., The Gun-FreeSchool
Zones Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate
Conm. of the Judiciary. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Barry Friedman. Prof. of
Law, Vanderbilt Univ.) (The Act serves "to deflect state and local governments from their
responsibilities .... Citizens are led to believe this is a problem that can and should be solved
in Washington.").
"' See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569. 581 (3d Cir.) (rejecting Commerce Clause
challenge to 18 U.S.C § 2119, federal carjacking statute, because court could "easily appreciate
how Congress could readily (and rationally) have believed that carjacking" affects commerce),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 750 (1995).
82 The Lopez decision not only eliminated the rational basis test, but also resurrected the
"substantially affects" test. Courts must now examine the actual effect of a particular act on
interstate commerce. Under this test. Congress cannot simply declare a nexus between the activity
and interstate commerce: Congress must now actually establish the connection. Prior to the
required connection, Congress' rational basis could apply to a substantial effect upon commerce.
any mere effect, or no effect, engendering serious confusion. It confused the distinction between
the effect and whether Congress had a reason for finding that effect.
Following Justice Thomas' concurrence, it is inevitable that problems will arise as to whose
determination controls whether there is a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez.
115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J.. concurring). But see Cargill v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 407.
409 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting finding that presence of migratory birds on
wetlands could have been rationally related to interstate commerce). Furthermore, the method
used for making this determination is not clear. See supra note 41-42 and accompanying text
(noting uncertainty surrounding substantial effects test). However, Congressional enactments
lacking substantive findings should not be upheld solely on the premise that they were enacted
and must therefore be valid. See Lopez. 115 S. Ct. at 1656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Such logic
places "the cart before the horse."
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on commerce.3 3 This particular erosion occurred primarily because
Congress, in some instances, asserted links to interstate commerce in the
statute.' By doing so, the government's burden was substantially reduced,
often permitting the government to prove only that the article being
Such a relaxed
regulated had once moved in interstate commerce.'

standard is easily satisfied and thus has often permitted Congress to
regulate activities having little actual connection with commerce.86
8 See, e.g., Virginia Surface, 452 U.S. at 276 (stating that courts must defer to Congressional findings that regulated activity affects interstate commerce); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547 (permitting regulation when activity affects interstate commerce). cert. denied. 421 U.S.
1014 (1975). In some instances, this lower standard resulted from incorrectly interpreting the
Wickard standard. See, e.g., United States v. Ramey. 24 F.3d 602. 606 (4th Cir. 1994)
("Congress may regulate non-commercial activities that merely 'affect' interstate commerce
. . ."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995). Aside from the misapplication of Wickard. there
were numerous other instances when this reduced standard was applied. See, e.g.. United States
v. Holland. 841 F. Supp. 143, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that possession of gun on school
grounds affects interstate commerce); United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71. 75 (4th Cir. 1992)
(stating that property designation "affects" commerce), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993);
United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that "drug trafficking
affects interstate commerce"), cert. denied. 499 U.S. 911 (1991).
1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994) (federal arson statute making it illegal to "damage
or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle or other real or personal
property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce") (emphasis added), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994) (federal gun control provision
making it illegal for convicted felon "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm...
shipped. .. in interstate or foreign commerce") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1994)
(Travel Act prohibiting "[w]hoever travels in interstate commerce . . . with intent to distribute
the proceeds of any unlawful activity").
I See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431.U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (only minimal showing
must be made that gun had been in commerce at some point); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d
1456. 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that proof that gun was stolen in Nevada and found in
California was sufficient link); United States v. Campbell, 891 F. Supp. 210, 212 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (only need to show gun had once moved in interstate commerce); United States v. Burns,
529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975) (nexus existed even though gun was out of commerce for eleven
months). But see United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (rejecting
contention that caracking implicated interstate commerce on sole basis that car was not from
Tennessee), rev'd, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994), cert.denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995). In Cortner,
Judge Wiseman questioned whether "a 1932 Ford which was manufactured in Detroit in the year
1931 and transported to the state of Tennessee" remaining there for over sixty years could "still
[be] in interstate commerce." Id. at 243.
1 See, e.g.. United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 1042 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that use of
interstate phone service and out-of-state mortgage was sufficient). cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1985
(1995); Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607 (holding that use from out-of-state source was sufficient), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995). But see United States v. Pappadopoulos. 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that use of out-of-state gas line as commerce link was insufficient effect on
interstate commerce). All three cases involved arson charges under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). See supra
note 84. It is interesting to note that both Moore and Ramey used the "effect on commerce"
standard, while Pappadopouloswas swayed by Lopez and required a greater connection. See also
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The Court, in its post-New Deal Commerce Clause decisions,
developed several new tests and amended existing ones, but failed to
invalidate any challenged federal legislation until the Lopez decision.87

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) (-Neither here nor in Wickard had the Court
declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities."). Even Wickard. however, allowed a relatively
weak connection by finding that the activity, despite being local, did exert a substantial effect on
interstate commerce when viewed as a whole. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111 (holding that homegrown
wheat can substantially affect interstate commerce).
" See Vicki C. Jackson. Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, LEGAL TIMEs, July 31, 1995.
at S31 (noting that Lopez represents first time since New Deal that Court struck down federal
statute which was enacted under Commerce Clause). Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion,
reflected on the Court's treatment of the Commerce Clause, and succinctly concluded that -It]he
progression of our Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons to the present was not marked. . . by
a coherent or consistent course of interpretation." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy. J..
concurring); see supra note 4 (discussing Gibbons). Of the six written opinions spawned by
Lopez, however, it seems that Justice Thomas' concurrence displayed the most frustration over
the differing and confusing tests employed by the Court over the years. One commentator
described Thomas' concurrence as "an intellectual tour de force [which] takes both the majority
and the dissent to task for straying from the framers' original intent for the [C]ommerce
[C]lause." Kamenar, supra note 71, at 27. Justice Thomas clearly felt that the Court had drifted
far from the original import of the Clause, and believed the Court was long overdue in setting
the limits of federal power. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas. J.. concurring) ('[Olur case law
has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause."). Analyzing the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause at the time it was drafted, Justice Thomas referred to
dictionaries which defined commerce as "selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting
for these purposes . . . [and concluded that] this understanding finds support in the etymology
of the word, which literally means 'with merchandise.'" Id. at 1643 (Thomas. J.. concurring)
(citations omitted). Justice Thomas also found that the framers used the terms "trade' and
"commerce" interchangeably throughout their debates, and "commerce." "manufacture, and
"agriculture" were treated as three distinct functions of business. Id. (Thomas. J.. concurring).
Further, he argued that the Court's expansive reading of the Commerce Clause in connection with
the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8. cl. 18. was so broad that it
effectively rendered the other Article I, section 8 powers superfluous and largely unnecessary.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas argued that to -be true to a
Constitution that does not cede a police power to the Federal Government . . . we must modify
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.- Id. at 1650-51 (Thomas. J., concurring). One
commentator has suggested that, to Justice Thomas. this would mean a revival of the literal
distinctions between commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture. Jackson. supra. at S3 1. One preNew Deal Commerce Clause decision which closely followed the distinctions Justice Thomas
advocated was United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895):
Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form
for use. The functions of commerce are different. . . . If it be held that the term
includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be subject of
commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include
all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that
Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate,
not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining; in short, every branch of human industry.
Id. (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888)).
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II.
A.

THE EFFECT OF LopEz: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Establishment of the "New" Test
Rather than creating certainty, these reduced standards turned the

lower courts into "rubber stamps," approving almost any regulation which
Congress could pass under the guise of the Commerce Clause."8 Lopez
presented the Court with an opportunity to remedy this. Faced for the first

time in sixty years 9 with a statute that possessed no connections to
interstate commerce either in the legislative process or in the act itself, 9'
the Court seized the opportunity to change the law. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, eager to reestablish the "substantially affects" test," according-

ly fashioned the opinion. 2
In effect, the Lopez decision made the "substantially affects" test the
sole test to apply in evaluating whether an activity is sufficiently related to
interstate commerce.93 By announcing the test immediately after reiterating the three areas in which Congress is empowered to regulate under the
Commerce Clause,' it is evident that the Court intended the test to have
Moreover, it appears that the test is to be utilized
a broad reach.9

See Dallet, supra note 50, at 191: Hlavac, supra note 50 at 1377.
19See Calve, supra note 80. at 1 (noting that for first time in 60 years. Court invalidated law
enacted under Commerce Clause).
10Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. The Supreme Court was not the first federal court to find
that there was no connection between the act and interstate commerce. See United States v.
Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (-Congress may be able to invent a
convincing relationship between the proscription in [section] 922(q) [of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act] and its right to regulate interstate commerce, but this court should not be called upon
to dream it up for Congress.").
It See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("There must ... be a showing that regulated activity has a
substantialeffect on ...commerce.") (emphasis added). Specifically in Virginia Surface. Justice
Rehnquist worried that the "substantially affects" test had been severely weakened and noted that
there was "a troublesome difference between what the Court does and what it says" in applying
the test. Id. at 311. Justice Rehnquist concluded there were limits to Congress' power and
.simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so." Id.
92Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630 ("We conclude ...that the proper test requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.").
1.Id. at 1630: see supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing Court's application of
"substantially affects" test).
94See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630 (reiterating three categories of activities which Congress
could regulate under Commerce Clause); supra note 26 (discussing three categories in which
Congress has power to regulate).
I Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the standard in connection with the third category:
"those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 162983
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regardless of whether Congress expressed a connection between the activity
and interstate commerce." By reestablishing the "substantially affects"
test, the majority discredited the rational basis test,' reasoning that
continued adherence to that standard would give Congress uncontrolled
access into any area of American life.9"
B.

Affirmation of the Principlesof Federalism

In addition to clarifying a murky area of jurisprudence, the Lopez
decision reaffirmed the separation of powers doctrine constructed to protect
citizens from abuse by the state or federal government. 99 Many commentators welcomed this recognition of the importance of federalism." °
While the Court acknowledged prior Supreme Court decisions that
espoused broad readings of the Commerce Clause, it pointed out that even
those holdings recognized a limit on Congress' Commerce power based
upon the system of federalism.'
More specifically, Justice Kennedy's

30.
9 Such a broad statement cannot be used to limit the Court's holding to instances where
Congress was silent since Chief Justice Rehnquist made no such distinction within the category.
Id. Indeed, the Court noted that Congressional findings were merely illustrative rather than
dispositive. Id. at 1631-32. Thus, whether Congress expressly stated a connection to interstate
commerce is irrelevant-review must nonetheless be undertaken.
I See id. at 1632 (suggesting that bare acceptance of Congress' rationale for federal
legislation would leave Congress' power devoid of limits).
98See id. at 1631 n.3 (stating that President Bush, in signing the Crime Control Act of 1990.
remarked that § 922(q) -inappropriately overrides legitimate state firearms laws with a new and
unnecessary Federal Law. The policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted
by the States, but they should not be imposed upon the States by Congress") (citing 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1944-45 (Nov. 29, 1990)). Similar to Congress' adoption of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, over 40 states already had similar "crime control" statutes on the books.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I This system of federalism is defined as one "which includes interrelationships among the
states and relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). Justice O'Connor has characterized the division of authority
between the states and the federal government as the "oldest constitutional question." Bennett L.
Gershman, Judicial "Conservatism". N.Y. L.J., June 21. 1995, at 2 (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144. 149 (1992)).
110See Kamenar, supra note 71, at 27 (supporting decision as "an important reaffirmation
of federalism principles"). -The Court provided a much needed firebreak to check the rapidly
spreading exercise of federal power over activities that are traditionally local in nature. . . ." Id.
at 27: Gershman, supra note 99, at 2 (reporting that act invalidated in Lopez -intruded upon
traditional state functions over education and criminal law, and if allowed, would have given
Congress virtually unlimited power to regulate any activity it chose"): Rotunda, supra note 72,
at C9 (describing effect of Lopez as "a reminder ... that Americans live in a federal structure.
with constitutional limits on the power that the federal government may exert").
101 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1628. Discussing the commerce power, the Court noted:
[It] must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
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concurring opinion stressed the importance of maintaining the federal
system of power, and the need for the Court to keep Congress within the

bounds of its constitutional mandate.' 02
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was an example of federal
involvement in an area traditionally reserved to the states-criminal law and

its enforcement. The significance of such a far-reaching federal statute is
illustrated by constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe's remark, "[i]f ever
there was an act that exceeded Congress' commerce power, this was
it.""0 3 Political philosophy aside, there are two practical reasons why it
is of paramount importance to maintain the federal-state balance. First, the
"federalization" of crimes that displace existing state criminal laws serves
no reasonable purpose other than to bolster the political capital of members

extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that
to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.
Id. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1. 37 (1937)). Further.
the Court opined that the Constitution outlined separate spheres of power which withheld from
the federal government a -plenary police power," that could be used to justify any type of
legislation. Id. at 1633. Rather, -It]he enumeration [of powers granted to Congress under the
Constitution] presupposes something not enumerated" must be left to the exercise of the several
states. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
102Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637-38. Justice Kennedy drew upon the Federalist papers and
caselaw to emphasize the values of federalism. Id. at 1638-39. Complimenting the Framers for
their creation of the dual-government system, Justice Kennedy referred to James Madison's oftquoted passage on the effect of federalism:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments .

. .

. The different governments

will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51. at 323 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Justice Kennedy also relied on Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458-59 (1991), where the Court reasoned "a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Lopez,
115 S.Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy advocated intervention when necessary to maintain the cherished tenets of
federalism: "[The federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for [the Supreme Court] to admit inability to intervene when
one or the other level of government has tipped the scales too far." Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J..
concurring). He also reasoned that political accountability and responsibility would bejeopardized
and the boundaries of state and federal powers obfuscated if the federal government was allowed
to regulate areas with a tenuous connection to commerce. Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
03 Joan Biskupic, Banon Guns NearSchoolsRejected; CongressExceeded Commerce Power,
High Court Holds, WASH. PosT, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al. A6. Another factor that may have
prompted Tribe to make this comment may have been the absence of legislative findings claiming
a relation between the act and interstate commerce. See supra note 90 and accompanying text
(discussing absence of legislative findings).
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of Congress. 1° Indeed, prior to the enactment of section 922(q), over
forty states already had criminal codes on the books proscribing gun
possession in or near schools. 15 Therefore, in reality, such federal laws
are a "wasteful duplication of resources where federal resources are
desperately needed for other functions. " " Second, federalization denies
states the opportunity to tailor criminal laws to their specific needs, and
precludes the states from "exercising their own judgment in an area to
which states lay claim by right of history and expertise .... "17 Thus,

4 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Folly ofOverfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1248-49
(1995) (arguing that legislatures pass such acts in part to gain political popularity). Professor
Kadish asserted that the federalization of local crime results in legislation which is "no better than
the process that produced it-the process of congressmen and women following the politically
profitable example of state legislators in buying popularity with essentially bogus anticrime laws."
Id. at 1249. Political realities are such that federal officials cater to constituents by promising
panaceas to societal problems; rarely do they take into account whether they have the authority
to legislate the solutions. See infra Part II.C. and accompanying notes (arguing that Lopez serves
as warning to legislators attempting to remedy "the nation's ills").
'16 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Professor Kadish wrote that the
burgeoning federalization of crime tends to crowd the federal courts with disputes which are more
appropriate for state courts. Kadish, supranote 104, at 1250-51 (noting that expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction has moved Court away from its traditional role of resolving civil disputes).
Kadish noted that:
Chief Justice Rehnquist told Congress ... "[w]e must decide whether we want the
federal courts to spend . . . their time hearing general criminal cases or whether we
want the federal courts to occupy their traditional role as a forum for civil disputes on
nationally important issues such as commerce, constitutional questions, civil rights and
civil liberties."
Kadish, supra note 104. at 1251 (quoting Robert Raven, Federal Courts as Police Courts:
FederalismRevisited, FIFTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (May 13, 1993)).
"oKadish, supra note 104, at 1249.
107Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J.. concurring). In concluding that this area of
regulation was not one which the federal government should regulate. Justice Kennedy-and the
Court opinion-did not question the seriousness of gun violence near schools. See id. at 1641
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging need to keep guns out of schools). Nor did the Court
question the admirable ends which Congress sought to achieve. It did question, however, the
means with which Congress sought to achieve its end, and specifically whether Congress was
constitutionally able to interfere in an area that the states were better equipped to regulate:
While it is doubtful that any State. or indeed any reasonable person. would argue that
it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable
disagreement exists about how to best accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role
as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution
is far from clear.
Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Professor Jackson agreed that the Kennedy concurrence
"point[ed] out how many different approaches are, in fact, taken by state and local governments
toward the goal of preventing guns in schools." Jackson, supra note 87, at S32. Further, Jackson
believed that the opinion "document[ed] a practical value to states' continuing experimentation
with the best means of controlling school violence." Id.; see Taylor, supra note 5, at 26-30 ("The
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the need to maintain our federal-state balance is supported by practical
reasons as well as the need to preserve that which our founding fathers
established.
C.

The Importance of JudicialReview
As previously stated,' the concept of judicial review is firmly
embedded in the Court's jurisprudence and today is a hallmark of our
system of government. The Lopez decision signals to Congress that
legislative enactments must fall within the confines of the Constitution or
face invalidation by the Court."° In short, Lopez puts legislators on
guard as they attempt to remedy society's ills. To what extent the decision

will influence Congress in this regard remains to be seen. One judiciallyminded senator has recently proposed a bill which would require Congress
to justify every law it passes by indicating how the law falls within an
enumerated congressional power. "0
Two renowned legal scholars, Dean Choper and Professor Wechsler,
believe that the Court should avoid cases that review the "scope of national

states are perfectly capable of banning possession of guns in or near schools.. . . And it makes
no sense to waste scarce federal law enforcement resources on such quintessentially local police
functions as patrolling schools.. . . In short the federal statute was duplicative and wasteful.").
But see Tracey W. Resch. Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the
Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUM 805, 821-22.
Despite the multiplication of federal criminal legislation and the enlarged jurisdictional
power of the federal government, the states remain active in the area of crime control
... . The federal government has entered this area gradually, reluctantly, and
primarily with programs aimed at organized crime, a problem generally felt to be
incapable of solution by the states acting alone.
Id.
,03See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing establishment and jurisprudential
history of review).
'19 See David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court Has Yet to
Reveal the True Significance of Lopez, 81 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1995) ("By enforcing limits on the
commerce power, the Court effectively warned Congress to move carefully when federalizing
criminal law or setting federal standards. . .

.");

see also Kamenar, supra note 71, at 27

("[P]erhaps most important, the Lopez decision will give members of Congress a principled
reason to oppose legislation by their colleagues who grandstand before their constituents by
rushing to federalize all of society's ills."); Rotunda, supra note 72, at C9 ("Lopez . . . may
encourage Congress to think about the source of its authority when enacting new laws.").
110Senator Spencer Abraham (R-Michigan), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
proposed the legislation. H.R. REP. No. 2270, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See State
Sovereignty and the Role of the FederalGovernment: Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Federalism,and Property Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1995)
(statement of John R. Carter, Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender) ("The proposed Federalism Act of
1995 ... requires that Congress indicate the constitutional authority for its laws, and consider
the extent to which they preempt state or local law."), Kamenar, supra note 71, at 25.
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power versus the scope of states' rights""' because the political process
naturally protects the federal-state balance.112
Professor Wechsler
contends that the political process provides a safeguard on Congressional
authority because the federal government is elected by all citizens.
Further, considerations of states' rights permeate the thinking of federal
officials, since they are each elected by residents of the individual
states." 3 Political mechanisms and party machinery, according to the
argument, are an important factor in decision making, because the
machinery and voters may become disenchanted with those representatives
who cast federal votes that adversely affect the states.'
Such reasoning,
while valid, nonetheless disregards Chief Justice John Marshall's seminal
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland:"5 "[w]e admit, as all must admit,

that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to
be transcended . . . . Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution."" 6 McCulloch and Marbury v. Madison"7 reflect
the Court's vital role in protecting these limits." 8 In Lopez, both the

. Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: Federalismand
IndividualRights, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 460. 462 (1995). -1 do not believe the Court
should be an enforcer of the values of federalism through its power of judicial review. ... " Id.
at 465. In his book, Dean Choper asserted that -[numerous structural aspects of the national
political system serve to assure that states' rights will not be trampled." making judicial review
unnecessary. JESSE H. CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 29596 (1980) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW]. Choper argues that the states have an adequate voice
in issues concerning the federal-state balance, and the Court need not be involved even where
"Congress and the president [are] joining forces and ignoring clear constitutional mandate." Id.
Professor Wechsler. who maintained a similar view, conceded "[t]his is not to say that the
Court can decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called upon to
face the question in the course of ordinary litigation." Herbert Wechsler. The PoliticalSafeguards
ofFederalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954).
..
2 JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 111. at 295-96.
"I Tape of Constitutional Law Course Lecture by Distinguished Professor of Law Albert J.
Rosenthal, held at St. John's University School of Law (September 15. 1995) (on file with
author).
114Id.

"1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

116Id. at 421. It is evident that Chief Justice Marshall recognized the inherent limitation on
Congress' power and the responsibility of the Court to quash the impermissible exercise of that

power.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 152 ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); supra note 1 and accompanying text
(discussing commentary and case law emphasizing Court's duty to interpret and uphold Constitution). While the Court in the past and in Lopez affirmed the difficult, yet critical role of judicial
review. Dean Choper strenuously argues that "the unconstitutional conditions principle has little
practical significance in the federalism area because there. . . is very little, if anything, Congress
18
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Court's opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion conclude that
judicial review, while at times difficult, is indispensable." 9 It is suggested that Dean Choper and Professor Wechsler, as well as the Lopez dissenters,"2' fail to recognize that the political process is a poor safeguard of
federalism.
Thus, if the individual citizen and the individual state cannot
effectively check federal laws which are repugnant to the Constitution, who
can? Only the courts can. Not only are its powers of judicial review a
hallmark of our government, but its justices are politically isolated. They
alone are charged with the duty to "say what the law is. " "

III.

THE EFFECT OF LOPEZ ON THE FUTURE

Shortly after the Court decided Lopez, President Clinton attacked the

decision in his weekly radio address, stating that he was "terribly
disappointed" and pledging to keep guns out of schools because "[t]hat's
what the American people want, and it's the right thing to do. " ' The
cannot do under the Commerce Clause." Choper, supra note 111, at 462.
"I Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial to determine Congressional authority would result in "legal uncertainty." Lopez. 115
S. Ct. at 1633. However, regardless of how "uncertain" such determinations may be. Chief
Justice Rhenquist contended that they are a necessary part of the task since our Constitution is
one of enumerated, limited powers. Id. "Any possible benefit from eliminating this 'legal
uncertainty' would be at the expense of the Constitution's system of enumerated powers." Id.
Justices Souter and Breyer, however, in their dissenting opinions, seemed to agree with
Dean Choper and Professor Wechsler in urging judicial restraint and deference to Congress. See
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Souter, J.. dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he practice of deferring
to rationally based legislative judgments 'is a paradigm of judicial restraint'") (quoting FCC v.
Beach Community, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)); see also Taylor, supra note 5, at 30
("The best argument for [Justice Breyer's] dissent may be that [the notion of limited powers]
should be a dead letter-or, at least, that we should rely on 'the political process.' rather than on
'judicially created limitations,' to set boundaries on congressional power.") (citing Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1984)). Justice Breyer views Commerce
Clause jurisprudence "not as a 'technical legal exception,' but as 'a practical one.'" Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer. J., dissenting) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398
(1905)).
Justice Kennedy, while acknowledging the importance of the "flexibility" afforded Congress
by the Supreme Court, concluded that "[i]t does not follow, however, that in every instance the
Court lacks the authority and responsibility to review congressional attempts to alter the federal
balance." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy. J.. concurring).
,20Id. at 1651 (Souter. J., dissenting) ("In judicial review under the Commerce Clause, it
reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly
assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from
Congress' political accountability.").
,21Marbury. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
1' Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1995, at 1.
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President directed the Attorney General to find methods to circumvent the
decision, remarking, "I want the action to be constitutional, but I am
determined to keep guns away from schools." 1"
Commentators speculate that Lopez calls into question other areas of
federal legislation that stand on uncertain constitutional grounds. These
areas include the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 24 wetland
and various environmental legislation," 2 tort reform,' 26 and federal
Senator Herbert Kohl, who introduced the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, referred to
Lopez as "a piece of judicial activism that ignores children's safety for the sake of legal
nitpicking." Biskupic, supra note 103, at Al. But see Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring) (stressing that gun violence near schools is important matter that must be addressed
by states). See also supra note 105 (stressing importance of traditional state functions).
" Purdum, supra note 122, at 1. As promised, President Clinton sent Congress the -GunFree School Zones Amendments Act of 1995" for the express purpose of legislatively overruling
the Lopez decision. See President's Calendar, Congressionaland PresidentialActivity. DAILY
REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, May 11, 1995, § F. In July, the Subcommittee on Youth Violence of
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on this matter. Capitol Hill
Hearing Testimony, FederalDocument Clearing House (July 18, 1995). Walter Dellinger, an
Assistant Attorney General, found that the proposed legislation would probably pass judicial
review. Id. As proposed. the Act, like the legislation prohibiting felons from possessing firearms,
would require the government to prove that the gun moved in interstate commerce. Id. Using the
Scarborough standard, the government would only have to prove that the gun had moved in
commerce. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 567-68 (1977) (allowing conviction on
basis that gun was once in commerce). Senator Orrin G. Hatch argued that the proposed
legislation was "short-sighted" and amounted to a "technical fix" which violated the principles
of federalism. Guns in Schools: Hearing ofSubcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Orrin Hatch, Senator).
Alternative constitutional powers under which the Gun-Free School Zones Act might survive
(such as the spending power) are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Lynn A.
Baker. ConditionalFederalSpending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1191 (1995) (discussing
alternative use of spending power to counter invalidations under other powers of various federal
laws).
' 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West 1988).
'z Kamenar believes federal environmental laws are particularly vulnerable. Kamenar. supra
note 71, at 25. He recalled the tenuous link which the Environmental Protection Agency used to
justify federal jurisdiction over wetlands not located near navigable waterways: i[wletlands trap
pollutants that might otherwise run off into a drainage ditch leading into a brook, which becomes
a stream, which eventually flows into a tributary of a navigable waterway used in interstate
commerce." Id. Anotherjustification for this federal power exists "solely because birds fly across
state lines and land on wetlands in somebody's backyard." Id. But see Cargill v. United States.
55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal law because presence of migratory birds on
wetlands was sufficient to link to interstate commerce), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995). The
circuit court was led by Congressional findings and, ignoring Lopez, applied the rational basis
test. Id. at 1394. But see Cargill v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 407, 409 (1995) (Thomas, J..
dissenting from a denial of certiorari) (arguing that government's case was very weak).
is the policy of
Also at risk is the Clean Water Act, which made express findings that "[i]t
the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution [and] to plan the development and use. . . of land and
water resources." CLEAN WATER ACT, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (West 1988).
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carjacking 27 and arson' 21 statutes.
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Lower courts are also uncertain about the future effect of Lopez.

Numerous Commerce Clause challenges have been brought before the
courts and many have found Lopez inapplicable.' 31 It is suggested that
these courts take a closer look at the Lopez decision. While there are some

cases which may satisfy the "substantially affects" test, there are numerous
others that do not.' 3' In light of Lopez, it is troubling that some courts
,. The area of tort reform is thrown into question by the Lopez decision. Federal legislators
and supporters of the movement, to curb tort damage awards, have grounded their proposal in
a cumulative effect theory similar to the government's argument in Lopez. See T.R. Goldman,
Tort Reform OpponentsHave New Weapon in Lopez, CONN. L. TRIB.. May 15, 1995. at 15. The
supporters argued that "It]he cost of massive punitive-damage awards are passed on to consumers
through increased insurance costs, increased product costs, reduced availability or products and
the impairment of the ability [of U.S. companies] to compete with other countries that don't have
this tort tax." Id. (quoting lobbyist Theodore Olson). Trial lawyers and consumer groups opposed
to the reform argue that state tort law has little, if any, connection to interstate commerce. Id.
Whether tort reform will survive under Lopez remains to be seen. The proponent's arguments are
substantially similar to the government's "national productivity" argument asserted in Lopez
which the Court rejected under the "substantially affects" test.
, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. 1995) (imposing fines and imprisonment for "[w]hoever. with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported
..

in interstate

.

.

commerce").

Stewart reasoned that "the destruction of a building is not easily described as a
.commercial activity'" under Lopez. Stewart. supra note 61, at 48. Further, land use and arson
laws are areas of "traditional concern of the States." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (stressing importance of traditional
state functions).
1,9 Compare United States v. Campbell, 891 F. Supp. 210, 212 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that
Lopez was not binding because government had to prove link to interstate commerce from possession of firearm by felon) with United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding insufficient connection to commerce on basis of gas supplied to residence by out-of-state
company). The Ninth Circuit applied Lopez to invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 844(j), a federal arson
statute. The court held that an out-of-state gas line attached to a private home did not have a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce to justify a federal arson investigation. The
PappadopoulosCourt distinguished this holding from its previous federal carjacking decisions,
reasoning that "[u]nlike a firearm or a car, both of which can readily move in interstate commerce, a house has a particularly local rather than interstate character." Id. at 527-28.
'1 See, e.g., United States v. Stillo. 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.) (finding that bribery affects law
firms' ability to purchase interstate goods), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 383 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that provision of abortion services exerted sufficient link
to commerce); United States v. Garcia-Beltan, 890 F. Supp. 67 (D.P.R. 1995) (holding that
carjacking had strong relation to interstate commerce); United States v. Edwards, 894 F. Supp.
340 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (stating that proof felon possessed gun which was once in commerce was
sufficient).
"I'See, e.g., Stillo, 57 F.3d at 558 (stating that acceptance of bribe would have depleted
funds from which interstate items could be purchased). While conceivably rational, the finding
in Stillo highlighted the need for a standard test. The Stillo court argued that Lopez was not
binding because Lopez interpreted a different law. Id. Instead, the court reasoned that prior judicial decisions enabled the court to find a minimal, potential effect sufficient. Id. This position is
'2.
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continue to adhere to outmoded standards of judicial review. Lopez made
it quite clear that the "substantially affects" test was to be employed for
specific Commerce Clause challenges and that the effect upon interstate
commerce must indeed be a substantial one.
CONCLUSION

The Lopez decision represents an important change in the judicial
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. No longer willing to permit
Congress to legislate its every wish, the Court now demands that the
regulated activity have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. While
the test itself is not new, its reemergence as the principal test is noteworthy. Congress, long accustomed to the expansion of its powers, must now
learn to temper its lawmaking in accordance with stricter constitutional
limits. Furthermore, the decision reflects a respect for federalism by
allowing the states to solve problems of a local character. While many
commentators have recognized the importance of Lopez, the lower federal
courts have been slow to follow suit. In light of lower court attempts to
narrow the holding of Lopez, the Court is urged to issue further pronouncements of the "substantially affects" test. The Court would be remiss if it
overlooked any opportunity to reinforce the strong message it sent in
Lopez, a long overdue precedent in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Michael C. Carroll
Paul R. Dehmel

somewhat absurd since it enables Congress to regulate virtually any activity-a result clearly
prohibited by Lopez. It is submitted that the StiUo court erred by not following the binding
authority set forth by the Supreme Court in Lopez.
Likewise, in Garcia-Beltran, the district court found a sufficient nexus with interstate

commerce, since carjacking necessarily involved the dismantling of cars and sending them to
other states. Garcia-Beltran,890 F. Supp. at 70. While this may often be the actual motivation
for the carjacking, in Garcia-Beltranthe motivation was gang animosities and the car was used
to facilitate a murder. Id. at 68-69. Any potential connection to interstate commerce on the basis
that the parts may be shipped across state lines was terminated when the car was blown up to hide
the evidence.
See also United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that Lopez

was not applicable to decide challenge to Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act on basis of
Congressional findings and used rational basis test to uphold law). While the Congressional
record may have in fact been sufficient, in light of Lopez, the use of the now-discarded rational
basis test was inappropriate.

